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What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage 
 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas is best seen as a cousin to 
Griswold v. Connecticut, invalidating a ban on the use of contraception within marriage, 
and Reed v. Reed, invalidating a preference for men over women in the administration of 
estates. In both cases, the Court struck down an anachronistic law palpably out of step 
with existing public convictions. Lawrence should be understood in the same terms, as 
rooted in a distinctly American-style doctrine of desuetude. The central principle is that 
at least if certain interests are involved, criminal statutes may not be invoked against 
citizens when the underlying moral judgments have become anachronistic, as 
demonstrated by a pattern of nonenforcement. A key problem here is procedural; it 
involves an absence of fair notice and arbitrary exercise of discretion. This 
understanding of the decision has implications for the many imaginable constitutional 
challenges to other laws involving sex and sexual orientation. After Lawrence, states are 
certainly prohibited from banning fornication; they are almost certainly forbidden to ban 
use of sexual devices. Bans on prostitution, incest, and adultery stand on firmer grounds, 
though even here responsible challenges can be imagined. After Lawrence, the 
Constitution almost certainly forbids public discrimination against those who have 
engaged in homosexual conduct, at least outside of certain specialized contexts (most 
notably the military). The hardest cases involve the failure to recognize same-sex 
marriages. The ban on same-sex marriages cannot be said to be an anachronism, even 
though it is not easy, in principle, to reject the law struck down in Lawrence while 
permitting states to deny gays and lesbians the right to marry. One general lesson, 
underlined by Lawrence, is that political and social change is usually a precondition for 
changed interpretation of the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, 
University of Chicago. I am grateful to Mary Anne Case, Carolyn Frantz, Richard A. Posner, Geoffrey 
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 In 1900, Mr. Dooley famously said that “[n]o matter whether th’ constitution 
follows th’ flag or not, th’ supreme court follows th ‘ilection returns.”1 The Court doesn’t 
really do that. But members of the Supreme Court live in society, and they are inevitably 
influenced by what society appears to think.2 My principal suggestion here is that the 
Court’s remarkable decision in Lawrence v. Texas3 is best seen as a successor to 
Griswold v. Connecticut45: judicial invalidation of a law that had become hopelessly out 
of touch with existing social convictions. So understood, Lawrence, like Griswold, 
reflects an American variation on the old English idea of desuetude. Put too simply, the 
basic idea is that when constitutionally important interests are at stake, due process 
principles requiring fair notice, and banning arbitrary action, are violated when criminal 
prosecution is brought on the basis of moral judgments lacking public support, as 
exemplified by exceedingly rare enforcement activity.6 
 
In Griswold, it will be recalled, the Court invalidated a Connecticut law 
forbidding married people to use contraceptives—a law that was ludicrously inconsistent 
with public convictions in Connecticut and throughout the nation.7 Griswold was decided 
in the midst of a substantial national rethinking of issues of sex and morality. Whatever 
the outcome of that rethinking, it was clear, by 1965, that reasonable people would no 
longer support bans on the use of contraceptives within marriage. In this respect, 
Griswold was quite similar to Reed v. Reed.8 There the Court struck down an Idaho 
statute giving a preference to men over women in the administration of estates of 
decedents who had died intestate—a law that was unquestionably a holdover from views 
about sex roles that were widely regarded as obsolete. Reed was decided in the midst of a 
substantial rethinking of gender roles; whatever the outcome of that rethinking, it was 
clear, by 1971, that a flat presumption in favor of men over women in employment would 
no longer be acceptable in principle.9 Lawrence belongs in the same family. In the area of 
                                                 
1Peter Dunne, The Supreme Court’s Decisions, in Mr. Dooley’s Opinions 26 (1900). 
2 Robert Dahl made this argument nearly a half-century ago, before much of the work of the Warren Court. 
Notwithstanding the passage of decades, his argument stands up well. See Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in 
a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 Journal of Public Law 279 (1957). 
3 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
4 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
5 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
6 I specify this brief statement below. 
7 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
8 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
9 The Court has shown special sensitivity to changing public convictions in the death penalty context. 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972), invalidated certain capital sentences, in a complex set of opinions 
that seemed to presage the end of capital punishment in the United States. At least in retrospect, Furman is 
best seen as a kind of “remand” to state legislatures, asking for a new assessment of whether capital 
punishment was consistent with contemporary values. The result of the “remand” was a new affirmation of 
public support for capital punishment, to which the Court subsequently deferred, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
US 153 (1976). In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-793 
(1982), the Court relied heavily on contemporary practices in striking down death sentences for rape and 
for a defendant who did not take or intend to take life.More recently, the Court ruled that the Constitution 
forbids application to capital punishment to the mentally retarded, see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 304 
(2002); in so ruling, the Court relied heavily on what it saw as changing social values. In a theme echoed in 
Lawrence, the Court wrote, A claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the standards that 
prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the ‘Bloody Assizes’ or when the Bill of Rights was 
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 sexual orientation, America is in the midst of a civil rights revolution -- one that has 
moved, in an extraordinarily short time, toward delegitimating prejudice against and 
hatred for homosexuals. Lawrence was made possible by that revolution, of which it is 
now a part. 
 
In making this argument, my principal goal is not to evaluate Lawrence, but 
instead to obtain an understanding of its scope and of its relationship to other apparently 
dramatic decisions in the Court’s past. But even if my argument is correct, it must be 
acknowledged that the Court’s remarkably opaque opinion has three principal strands.10 
Each of those strands supports a different understanding of the Court’s holding and the 
principle that supports it. 
 
1. Autonomy. A tempting reading of Lawrence is straightforward: A criminal 
prohibition on sodomy is unconstitutional because it intrudes on private sexual 
conduct that does not harm third parties. On this view, the Court has endorsed a quite 
general principle: Without a compelling justification, the state cannot interfere with 
consensual sexual behavior, at least if that behavior is noncommercial. On this view, 
consensual sexual behavior counts as a fundamental right for purposes of the due 
process clause. The state is forbidden to intrude into the domain of consensual sexual 
behavior unless it can show that its intrusion is the least restrictive means of 
achieving a compelling state interest—a showing that will be impossible to make, at 
least most of the time.  
 
2. Rational basis. An alternative reading of Lawrence, also quite broad, would take the 
Court to have held, not that sexual behavior counts as a fundamental right requiring 
compelling justification, but that the criminal prohibition on sodomy is 
unconstitutional because it is not supported by a legitimate state interest. The 
principle here is that the government cannot interfere with consensual sexual behavior 
if it is attempting to do so for only moral reasons, unaccompanied by a risk of actual 
harm. The implications of this reading are not so different from those of the first; both 
are Millian in nature.11 But the two readings are nonetheless different, because the 
second depends not on the fundamental nature of the right to engage in sexual 
activity, but instead on the absence of even plausibly legitimate grounds for 
interfering with that right in the context of consensual sodomy. On this reading, 
                                                                                                                                                 
adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.” Id. at 311. In a key passage, the Court suggested: “It is 
not so much the number of these States [abolishing the death penalty for the mentally retarded] that is 
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change. Given the well-known fact that anticrime 
legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the 
large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of 
States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides powerful evidence 
that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average 
criminal.” Id. at 315. Note also that the Court emphasized that even in states that authorized the death 
penalty to those with mental retardation, few were actually willing to impose that punishment, an idea with 
clear links to the rationale in Lawrence. 
10 In this respect, the decision is akin to Plyler v. Doe, 457 US 202 (1982), in which the Court struck down 
a law requiring children of illegal aliens to pay for public education; there too the Court’s opinion was an 
amalgam of considerations, without a clear doctrinal foundation. 
11 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press 1956) (1859). 
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 Lawrence is rooted in a form of “rational basis” review, one that dooms a great deal 
of legislation. 
 
3. Desuetude, American-style. A narrower reading of Lawrence, my emphasis here, 
would take the following form: The criminal prohibition on sodomy is 
unconstitutional because it intrudes on private sexual conduct without having a strong 
or even legitimate moral grounding in existing public commitments. If this is the 
Court’s holding, it is undergirded by a more general principle: Without a strong 
justification, the state cannot bring the criminal law to bear on consensual sexual 
behavior if enforcement of the relevant law can no longer claim to have strong moral 
support in the enforcing state or the nation as a whole. This aspect of the opinion is 
rooted in the old idea of desuetude. It suggests that, at least in some circumstances, 
involving certain kinds of interests, a criminal law cannot be enforced if it has lost 
public support. 
  
It should be clear that while all three principles are potentially broad, the first and 
the second are the most far-reaching. And there is actually a fourth understanding of the 
opinion, one that cannot be characterized as the Court’s holding, but one that is perhaps a 
subtext: 
 
4. Equality. Sodomy laws are unconstitutional because they demean the lives of gays 
and lesbians and thus offend the Constitution’s equality principle. The underlying 
principle is that as a general rule, there is no legitimate basis for treating homosexuals 
differently than heterosexuals. On this view, Lawrence is really a case about the 
social subordination of gays and lesbians, whatever the rhetoric about sexual freedom 
in general. Lawrence’s words sound in due process, but much of its music involves 
equal protection.  
 
Each of the four ideas can be found in Lawrence, a claim that I hope to establish 
here. But I want to draw special attention to the third, which is, I believe, central to the 
Court’s own analysis, and a key to the development of substantive due process over the 
past decades. In fact something like a desuetude principle is part and parcel of the 
Lawrence Court’s treatment of the state’s interest, showing why that interest counts as 
illegitimate, and also of the Court’s explanation of why the case cannot be distinguished 
from Griswold and its successors. When the Court asserts the absence of a “legitimate 
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of an 
individual,”12 it is best understood to be saying that the moral claim that underlies the 
intrusion has become hopelessly anachronistic. And the anachronistic nature of that moral 
claim has everything to do with the Court’s rejection, not of moral claims in general, but 
of the particular moral claim that underlies criminal prohibitions on same-sex sodomy. 
 
 Lawrence might be read broadly as an effort to enact some version of John Stuart 
Mill’s On Liberty13, requiring respect for individual choices (at least with respect to sex) 
unless there is some kind of harm to others. But it is reasonable to understand the Court’s 
                                                 
12 123 S. Ct. at 2484. 
13 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press 1956) (1859). 
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 decision more narrowly, as a ruling that forbids invocation of generally unenforced 
criminal law on the basis of a moral justification that has become anachronistic -- at least 
when a constitutionally important interest is involved and when the absence of significant 
enforcement activity can be explained only by reference to the anachronistic nature of the 
relevant moral justification. This reading also helps clarify what made the decision 
possible and its future fate. If I am correct, Lawrence was possible not because the Court 
reached, all on its own, an ambitious and novel view of the nature of constitutional 
liberty, or because it attempted to read a controversial view of autonomy into the due 
process clause. The decision was possible only because of the ludicrously poor fit 
between the sodomy prohibition and the society in which the justices live. And if I am 
correct, Lawrence will have broad implications only if and to the extent that those broad 
implications receive general public support. For example, the Supreme Court may or may 
not read Lawrence to require state to recognize gay and lesbian marriages. But if it does 
so, it will be following public opinion, not leading it. Political and social change was a 
precondition for Lawrence, whose future reach will depend on the nature and extent of 
that change. 
 
 While I will spend most of my time on the Court’s due process ruling, my own 
view is that the proper course in Lawrence was sketched by Justice O’Connor in her 
concurring opinion.14 Rather than invalidating the Texas statute on grounds of substantive 
due process, the Court should have invoked the equal protection clause to strike down, as 
irrational, the state’s decision to ban homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomy. 
This approach would have been more cautious than the Court’s own. It would have had 
the large advantage of making it unnecessary to overrule any precedent.15 At the same 
time, an equal protection ruling would have recognized the fact, established by the 
Court’s opinions, that the equal protection clause does not build on longstanding 
traditions, but instead rejects them insofar as they attempt to devalue or humiliate certain 
social groups.16 The problem in Lawrence is not adequately understood without reference 
to the social subordination of gays and lesbians, not least through the use of the criminal 
law. Hence Justice O’Connor’s approach suggests, lightly to be sure, the plausibility of 
rationale (4) above, a rationale that seems to me essentially correct. And if states are 
required to punish heterosexual sodomy if they are attempting to punish homosexual 
sodomy, I believe that it is quite implausible to think that any form of sodomy would be 
subject to criminal prosecution; political safeguards are far too strong to permit 
significant numbers of arrests and prosecutions of heterosexuals for engaging in conduct 
that is quite widespread.  
 
                                                 
14 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
15 I do not engage here the debate over whether principles of stare decisis required the Court to refuse to 
overrule Bowers v. Hardwick. My only suggestion is that the Court should not have overruled that decision 
when it was unnecessary to do so in order to decide Lawrence. A possible objection to the equal protection 
approach, one that I also cannot engage here, is that this approach is actually broader than that taken by the 
majority, above all because it would seem to require states to recognize same-sex marriages. It is true that 
an equal protection ruling would raise questions about bans on such marriages. But as we shall see, a due 
process ruling has the same effect.  
16 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996). 
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 For all these reasons, invalidation on equal protection grounds would have been 
preferable to the substantive due process route. But if the due process clause is to be 
invoked, the idea of desuetude provides a method for understanding, disciplining, and 
narrowing what the Court did. This reading of Lawrence prevents the opinion from being 
a simple invocation of “liberty”; it also helps explain what made the Lawrence decision 
possible from a generally conservative Supreme Court. Best of all, it has considerable 
independent appeal.17 
 
This Article comes in four parts. The first explores the Court’s dilemma in 
Lawrence—the state of pre-Lawrence law, the available options, and the difficulties with 
those options. The second discusses Lawrence itself, emphasizing the various strands to 
which I have referred. The third discusses possible readings of the decision and tries to 
unpack them. Here I draw attention to the more narrow reading of the opinion, suggesting 
that if understood in a way that emphasizes the anachronistic and almost never enforced 
nature of the Texas statute, the Lawrence decision can claim a strong foundation in both 
democratic values and the rule of law. The fourth explores the implications of the 
Lawrence decision for constitutional attacks on laws regulating sexual relationships, 
constitutional attacks on government discrimination against gays and lesbians, and 
constitutional attacks on laws refusing to recognize same-sex marriages.  
 
I. The Court’s Dilemma 
 
 The facts of Lawrence were exceedingly simple. Police officers in Houston, 
Texas responded to a private report of a weapons disturbance in a private residence. They 
entered the residence, owned by John Geddes Lawrence. On entering, they did not see 
any weapons. But they did see Lawrence, engaging in a sexual act with Tyron Garner. 
Lawrence and Garner were arrested, held in custody, and convicted of the crime of 
“deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex (man).”18 
They were each fined $200.19 Deviate sexual intercourse is defined to include “any 
contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another 
person” or “the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.”20 
The Texas law was challenged on equal protection and due process grounds.21 
 
 The Lawrence Court had three options. It could have invalidated the Texas statute 
on equal protection grounds. It could have invalidated that law on due process grounds. 
Or it could have upheld the law against both challenges. As we will see, the Court faced a 
serious difficulty in Lawrence: a majority believed, in my view correctly, that the Texas 
statute had to be invalidated -- but any rationale for invalidation would inevitably raise 
serious doubts about practices, including the ban on same-sex marriages, that the majority 
did not want to question. For the majority, a central problem was to develop a rationale 
                                                 
17 See Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-
Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 Harv. L. 80 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999). 
18 123 S. Ct. at 2475-76. 
19 41 S.W.3d at 349. 
20 Id. at 2476 (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.01(1)). 
21 Id. 
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 that would strike down the Texas statute without producing an unintended revolution in 
the law. Let us investigate the Court’s options in light of preexisting law. 
 
A. Equal Protection 
 
1. Heightened scrutiny. The Equal Protection Clause might have been used to 
strike down the Texas law under decisions calling for “heightened scrutiny” of laws that 
discriminate against traditionally disadvantaged groups. The paradigm examples of such 
groups are, of course, African-Americans and women.22 Perhaps laws discriminating 
against gays and lesbians should be subject to similarly skeptical judicial scrutiny.23 To 
say the least, the Court has not laid down a clear test for deciding when such scrutiny will 
be applied; instead it has pointed to a series of considerations, including a history of 
discrimination, a circumstance of immutability, and political powerlessness.24 Probably 
the best way of making sense of the doctrine is to say that heightened scrutiny is applied 
when the relevant discrimination is peculiarly likely to reflect prejudice and hostility 
rather than legitimate interests. In the context of race, for example, the problem is not that 
skin color is immutable, but that discrimination against African-Americans is usually 
based on illicit considerations; heightened scrutiny is a way of testing whether other, 
public-spirited justifications can actually be brought forward in defense of the relevant 
law. Discrimination against homosexuals can be understood in analogous terms. Suppose, 
for example, that a school forbids homosexuals from becoming teachers,25 or that a police 
department refuses to hire gays them.26 If heightened scrutiny were applied, a ban on 
same-sex sodomy would be extremely difficult to defend.  
 
As a matter of precedent, the problem is that the Court has never suggested that 
gays and lesbians are entitled to heightened scrutiny. In fact it has been extremely 
reluctant to expand the class of groups so entitled—ruling, for example, that rational 
basis review applies to discrimination against handicapped people27 and elderly people.28 
These are not decisive problems, to be sure; a ruling that required heightened scrutiny is 
not foreclosed by existing decisions. But such a ruling would certainly be an innovation. 
 
An alternative route to heightened scrutiny would be to contend that 
discrimination against homosexuals is a kind of discrimination on the basis of sex.29 Here 
it might be suggested that if a law punishes same-sex sodomy, it is punishing people who 
would not be punished if their gender were different. But this view raises a number of 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
23 See David Richards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Religious) Classification, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 491 
(1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 Ind. L.J. 1, 8 (1994). 
24 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 US 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
25 Glover v. Williamsburg Local School District Board of Education, 20 F.Supp.2d 1160 (U.S. District 
Court, S.D.Ohio, 1998). 
26 See, e.g., Childers v. Dallas Police Department, 513 F.Supp. 134 (U.S. District Court, N.D. Texas, 1981) 
27 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
28 Massachusetts v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1981).  
29 See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1994). 
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 complexities.30 It would also seem to have broad implications, essentially treating all 
discrimination against gays and lesbians as indistinguishable from, because literally 
identical to, discrimination against women.31 
 
2. Rationality review. When rational basis review is applied, statutes are almost 
always upheld under the equal protection clause.32 But three cases provided a plausible 
backdrop for the plaintiffs’ challenge in Lawrence. Taken together, the three cases 
suggest that a bare “desire to harm a politically unpopular group”33 is constitutionally 
unacceptable. Texas’ prohibition of homosexual sodomy, not affecting heterosexual 
sodomy, could be challenged as reflecting such a bare desire. 
 
The problem in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno arose from 
Congress’ decision to exclude from the food stamp program any household containing an 
individual who was unrelated to any other member of the household. 34 Thus the statute 
required that any household receiving food stamps must consist solely of “related” 
individuals.35 The Court invalidated the statute. The Court noted that the legislative 
history suggested a congressional desire to exclude "hippies" and "hippie communes."36 
To this the Court said: "[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' 
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest . . . ."37 
This idea was extended in the Cleburne case, in which the plaintiffs challenged a city’s 
denial of a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally 
retarded.38 Applying rational basis review, the Court admonished that "mere negative 
attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning 
proceeding, are not permissible bases for"39 unequal treatment. Thus the Court concluded 
that the discriminatory action under review was based "on an irrational prejudice."40 And 
in Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down a Colorado law forbidding localities from 
including gays and lesbians within the protection of laws prohibiting discrimination.41 
The Court held that the law violated rational basis review because it was based not on a 
legitimate public purpose but on a form of “animus”—with the apparent suggestion that 
statutes rooted in “animus” represent core offenses of the equal protection guarantee. The 
Court said that the law stands (and falls) as "a status-based classification of persons 
undertaken for its own sake."42 
 
                                                 
30 See id. for detailed discussion. 
31 See id.; I essentially accept this claim in Sunstein, supra note 16.  
32 See, e.g., id.; Lalli v. Lalli, 429 U.S. 259 (1978). 
33 United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
34 See id. 
35 Id. at 530. 
36 Id. at 534. 
37 Id. 
38 473 U.S. 432. 
39 Id. at 448. 
40 Id. at 450. 
41 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
42 Id. at 621. 
8 
  An equal protection ruling in Lawrence, based on these cases, would have had a 
great deal of appeal. It would have made it unnecessary for the Court to reconsider 
Bowers v. Hardwick43. It would have built carefully on Romer v. Evans. In these ways, 
such a ruling would have been narrow, converting the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer trilogy 
into the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer-Lawrence quartet. On the other hand, it is not clear that 
such a ruling would have had more limited consequences than a due process ruling. An 
invalidation of the line between homosexual and heterosexual sodomy would have raised 
questions about a host of other discriminatory practices. Is the state permitted not to 
recognize gay marriages? To discriminate against homosexuals in its employment 
practices? If the Court wanted to cabin the reach of its ruling, and not to create anything 
like a revolution in the law, these were important (and difficult) questions to answer. 
 
B. Due Process 
  
The modern story of substantive due process begins in 1965, when the Court 
invalidated a Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives by married people.44 
After that decision, the Court decided a set of cases protecting certain decisions involving 
sex, reproduction, the family, and other areas that appeared to be intimate and private.45 
The cases turned out to be quite unruly, and there was no clear line between what was 
protected and what was not.46  
 
A possible view would be that since Bowers, or at least since Washington v. 
Glucksberg,47 the Court has said something like this: “Thus far, but no further!” Since 
1985, the Court has been extremely reluctant to use the idea of substantive due process to 
strike down legislation, and before Lawrence, the Court seemed unwilling to add to the 
list even if the logic of the prior cases suggested that it ought to do so.48 On this view, the 
Court’s refusal to overrule Roe v. Wade49 reflects not approval of that decision, and much 
less a willingness to extend its logic, but a kind of temporal dividing line between 
permissible and prohibited uses of substantive due process.50 In other words, the 
continuing validity of Roe suggests not that the Court will try to follow the logic of the 
privacy cases, but that the Court will refuse to overrule its precedents while also failing to 
build on their logic. 
 
If we sought to bring more principled order to the Court’s decisions, we might 
invoke the Court’s own words and insist that any asserted right must have a strong 
foundation in Anglo-American traditions. This was the limiting principle invoked in both 
Bowers and Glucksberg. In Bowers, the Court, quoting Justice Powell, emphasized the 
                                                 
43 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy). 
44 Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. 
45 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 
678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
46 For a general discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 Yale L.J. 1123 (1997) 
47 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that there is no fundamental right to assistance in committing suicide). 
48 The most obvious example here is Glucksberg, id. 
49 410 U.S. 113. 
50 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding some state 
restrictions on abortion). 
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 need to ask whether the relevant liberties “are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.’”51 In Glucksberg, the Court said that “the development of this Court’s 
substantive-due-process jurisprudence . . . has been…carefully refined by concrete 
examples involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradition.”52 
The Court stressed that this historical test tended “to rein in the subjective elements”53 
and to avoid “the need for complex balancing of competing interests in every case.”54 
The historical approach might have the advantage of disciplining judicial discretion, but 
it has the disadvantage of fitting extremely poorly with some of the cases. It is not at all 
clear, for example, that the right to choose abortion has a strong foundation in tradition. 
Nonetheless, it would hardly be implausible, before Lawrence v. Texas, to argue that 
henceforth, the line between protected and unprotected interests would turn largely on 
history.  
 
II. What the Court Did 
 
A. Substantive Due Process Reborn 
 
 The heart of the Court’s opinion in Lawrence began with a dramatic reading of 
precedent, stating, for the first time in the Court’s history, that the Constitution 
recognizes a right to make sexual choices free from state control. Putting Griswold 
together with Eisenstadt, the Court said that “the right to make certain decisions 
regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship.”55 Taken by itself, this 
statement equivocates between two readings: the state may not punish sexual activity 
through the particular means of the threatening unwanted pregnancy56; or the state may 
not punish sexual activity at all. But the Court clearly endorsed the broader reading. In 
speaking of homosexual activity in particular, the Court said that the government was 
seeking “to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal 
recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished 
as criminals.”57 Thus the Court suggested that the state could not intrude on sexual liberty 
“absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.”58 Here, then, is the 
foundation for a reading of Lawrence as rooted in a general principle of sexual autonomy. 
 
                                                 
51 478 U.S. at 194. 
52 521 U.S. at 722. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 123 S. Ct. at 2477. 
56 Thus it would have been possible to read the contraception cases as holding, not that the state may not 
punish consensual sexual activity, but that it cannot do so through the indirect and discriminatory means of 
threatening childbirth. The early privacy cases did not involve bans on sexual activity; instead they 
involved efforts to control such activity by prohibiting the use of contraception. A narrow reading of the 
cases would suggest that there is no right to immunity from state regulation of sex, but instead a right not to 
be subject to regulation through the indirect method of risking unwanted pregnancy. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Designing Democracy (2002). 
57 123 S. Ct. at 2478. 
58 Id. 
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 The Court then turned from its precedents to an investigation of the suggestion in 
Bowers that prohibitions on same-sex sodomy “have ancient roots.”59 Rejecting that 
conclusion, the Court emphasized the complexity of American traditions on this count. In 
a lengthy discussion, the Court undermined the suggestion that there has been an 
unbroken path of hostility to same-sex sodomy. But the Court freely conceded that there 
is no history of accepting that practice; it did not contend that traditions affirmatively 
support a constitutional right to sexual freedom in that domain. On the contrary, and in a 
dramatic departure from both Bowers and Glucksberg, the Court said that longstanding 
traditions were not decisive. What were important were current convictions, not old ones. 
“[W]e think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance 
here.”60 Hence the Court stressed an “emerging recognition that liberty gives substantial 
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex.”61 
 
The emerging recognition could be seen in many places. First, the Model Penal 
Code did not endorse criminal penalties on consensual sexual activities conducted in 
private; and several states specifically changed their laws in response to the Model Penal 
Code.62 Second, fewer than half the states (24) outlawed sodomy even in 1986, and the 
statutory prohibition went largely unenforced even in those states.63 Third, the practices 
of Western nations were increasingly opposed to the criminal punishment of homosexual 
conduct. Britain repealed its law forbidding homosexual conduct in 1967,64 and the 
European Court of Human Rights concluded that laws banning consensual homosexual 
conduct are invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights.65 Fourth, only 
thirteen states now forbid such conduct, and of these just four have laws that discriminate 
only against homosexual conduct.66 “In those states where sodomy is still proscribed, 
whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern of nonenforcement with 
respect to consenting adults acting in private.”67  
 
The Court added that it had issued two decisions casting the holding of Hardwick 
“into even more doubt.”68 In Casey, the Court had reaffirmed not only Roe but also its 
commitment to substantive due process, emphasizing “that our laws and traditions afford 
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”69 Thus the Court read 
Casey as an endorsement of the ideas underlying Roe, and not simply as a refusal to 
reject a decision on which the nation had come to rely. And in Romer v. Evans, the Court 
                                                 
59 478 U.S. at 192.  
60 123 S. Ct. at 2480. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 2480-81. 
63 Id. at 2481 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-93). 
64 Id. (citing Sexual Offences Act, 1967, c. 60, § 1). 
65 Id. (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)). The use of materials from other 
nations, for the interpretation of the United States Constitution, raises many complexities, which I cannot 
explore here. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
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 struck down a law “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”70 These 
decisions made Bowers decreasingly plausible. 
 
The Court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s equal protection challenge, based on 
Romer, was “tenable.”71 But the Court said that “the instant case requires us to address 
whether Bowers itself has continuing validity.”72 (This is remarkable because the instant 
case “required” no such thing; it would have been fully possible to resolve the case 
without addressing Bowers.) The Court explained that if the Texas statute were 
invalidated on equal protection grounds, it would remain unclear whether a statute could 
forbid both same-sex and different-sex sodomy.73 The Court added that when 
“homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of 
itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public 
and in the private spheres.”74 In the Court’s view, the continued validity of Bowers 
“demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”75 Here the Court emphasized the stigma 
imposed by the law, coming not only from the fact that the act is a misdemeanor but also 
because of “all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged.”76 The collateral 
consequences of the criminal conviction could not be avoided.  
 
At this point the Court emphasized that Bowers had been eroded not only by 
Casey and Romer, but also by independent sources. Academics had widely criticized the 
decision.77 Five different state courts had refused to follow it in interpreting their own 
state constitutions.78 The European Court of Human Rights, along with other nations, had 
rejected the Bowers approach, a relevant fact “to the extent that Bowers relied on values 
we share with a wider civilization.”79 Stare decisis was relevant but not conclusive, for 
the Bowers decision did not produce detrimental reliance “comparable to some instances 
where recognized individual rights are involved.”80 The Court concluded that “Bowers 
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”81  
 
 The Court was aware of the potential breadth of its ruling, and it took steps to 
clarify its scope. “The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons 
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might 
not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not 
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
                                                 
70 Id. at 2482 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 2483 (citing C. Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution—A Firsthand Account 81-
84 (1991); R. Posner, Sex and Reason 341-50 (1992)). 
78 Id. (citing Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600 (2002); Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327 (1998); Gryczan v. State, 
283 Mont. 433 (1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. 
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992)). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 2484. 
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 homosexual persons seek to enter.”82 What was involved instead was “full and mutual 
consent” to engage in “sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. . . . The State 
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual 
conduct a crime.”83 In a closing word, the Court said that the Texas law “furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of 
the individual.”84 
 
B. Other Voices 
 
I will return to the complexities in the opinion shortly. For the moment, let us 
explore the views of the three other justices who wrote in Lawrence.  
 
1. Equal protection and Justice O’Connor. Justice O’Connor rejected the Court’s 
due process holding and urged the equal protection route. Building on the Moreno-
Cleburne-Romer trilogy, she contended that when a law is based on “a desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group,” the Court has applied “a more searching form of rational 
basis review.”85 She added that invalidation, via rational basis review, is more likely 
when the challenged legislation “inhibits personal relationships.”86  
 
To be sure, Texas had justified its law as a means of promoting morality, and that 
kind of justification had been found sufficient in Bowers, which Justice O’Connor did not 
seek to disturb. But Bowers was decided under the due process clause. Lawrence was 
different, because it presented the not-yet-decided question “whether, under the Equal 
Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by itself a 
statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy.”87 She concluded 
that it is not. Under rational basis review, moral disapproval is not a sufficient basis for 
discriminating among groups of persons. “Texas’ invocation of moral disapproval as a 
legitimate state interest proves nothing more than Texas’ desire to criminalize 
homosexual sodomy.”88 And because the law is enforced so infrequently, “the law serves 
more as a statement of dislike and disapproval than as a tool to stop criminal behavior.”89  
 
 Aware of the potentially broad implications of the equal protection argument, 
Justice O’Connor urged that her analysis would not doom all distinctions between 
homosexuals and heterosexuals. With her eye firmly on the military and on family law, 
she said that “Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as national 
security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage.”90 In the latter context, 
                                                 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 2485 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
86 Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
87 Id. at 2486 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
88 Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
89 Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
90 Id. at 2487-88 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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 “other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral 
disapproval of an excluded group.”91 
 
2. Scalia, the slippery slope, and “a massive disruption of the current social 
order.” Justice Scalia’s argument had three elements. First, he chastised the Court for 
what he saw as its palpable inconsistency on the issue of stare decisis. Invoking stare 
decisis, the Court had refused to overrule Roe, a nineteen-year-old ruling, in its Casey 
decision in 1992.92 The same Court was now willing to overrule Bowers, decided 
seventeen years previously. Justice Scalia saw no justification for the differential 
treatment. Second, Justice Scalia urged that the Court’s ruling would have extremely 
large implications. “State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, 
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity” can be upheld 
“only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of 
these laws is called into question by today’s decision.”93 The Court’s decision therefore 
entails “a massive disruption of the current social order”94 (something that could not have 
been said about a decision to overrule Roe). Thus Justice Scalia urged that the Court’s 
opinion “dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to 
be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in 
marriage is concerned.”95 
 
Justice Scalia’s third argument involved the proper interpretation of the 
Constitution in principle. After doubting that the due process clause is a substantive 
safeguard at all, he urged that as it has developed, the idea of substantive due process has 
been disciplined by asking whether the relevant rights are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition.”96 Justice Scalia questioned the idea that there is an “emerging 
awareness”97 that consensual homosexual activity should be protected; but his more basic 
objection was that any emerging awareness was irrelevant. “Constitutional entitlements 
do not spring into existence because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal 
sanctions on certain behavior.”98 Justice Scalia saw the Court as holding that the moral 
views underlying the Texas statute did not provide a legitimate basis for it. Here his 
objection was exceedingly simple: “This effectively decrees the end of all morals 
legislation.”99 With respect to equal protection, Justice Scalia urged that a rational basis 
was what was required, and that as for due process purposes, “the enforcement of 
traditional notions of sexual morality” provided the rational basis.100 
 
3. Thomas and the uncommonly silly law. Justice Thomas’ short dissenting 
opinion emphasizes that as a member of the Texas legislature, he would vote to repeal the 
                                                 
91 Id. at 2488 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
92 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 844). 
93 Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
95 Id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
96 Id. at 2492 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
98 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
99 Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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 relevant law. “Punishing someone for expressing his sexual preference through 
noncommercial consensual conduct with another adult does not appear to be a worthy 
way to expend valuable law enforcement resources.”101 Invoking Justice Stewart’s 
concurrence in Griswold, he contended that the law is “uncommonly silly,”102 but that 
nothing in the Constitution forbids it.103 
 
III. Interpretive Puzzles 
 
 I will suggest that Lawrence is best understood as responsive to what the Court 
saw as an emerging national awareness, reflected in a pattern of nonenforcement, that it is 
illegitimate to punish people because of homosexual conduct -- and that the decision 
therefore embodies a kind of American-style desuetude. But to support this suggestion, it 
will be necessary to unpack the Court’s opaque opinion, which raises a number of 
puzzles. Let us begin with the simplest. 
 
A. A Fundamental Right or Rational Basis Review? 
 
Was Lawrence based on rational basis review, or instead on something else? It is 
astonishing but true that this question is exceedingly difficult to answer. 
 
If the Court had attempted to write a conventional due process opinion, it would 
have taken one of two routes. First, the Court might have said that the right to engage in 
consensual sexual activity qualifies as fundamental, so that the government may not 
interfere with that right unless it has a compelling justification.104 Second, the Court 
might have said that whether or not the relevant right qualifies as fundamental, the state 
cannot interfere with it, simply because it lacks a legitimate reason to justify the 
interference. But the Court said neither, at least not in plain terms. The Court did not 
unambiguously identify any “fundamental interest” on the part of the plaintiffs that would 
support its ruling. In fact it did not use the “fundamental interest” formulation at any 
point in its analysis. Moreover, the Court did not say that the Texas statute lacked a 
“rational basis.” In fact it did not use the “rational basis” formulation at any point in its 
analysis. Much of the opacity of the Court’s opinion stems from its failure to specify 
what kind of review it was applying to the Texas statute. 
 
To be sure, the Court did end its opinion with a reference to the absence of any 
“legitimate interest” on the state’s part.105 Justice Scalia seized on this point to urge that 
the Court issued a rational basis opinion after all106—a characterization to which the 
Court (revealingly?) does not specifically object. Thus Justice Scalia contends that much 
of the Court’s opinion “has no relevance to its actual holding,”107 which was that the 
statute failed rational basis review. Justice Scalia’s reading cannot be said to be senseless; 
                                                 
101 Id. at 2498 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
102 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
103 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
104 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113. 
105 123 S. Ct. at 2484. 
106 Id. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
107 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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 it is not demonstrably wrong. But I believe that it is incorrect, and that in the end the 
Court’s opinion treats the relevant right as a fundamental one. Begin with the most 
relevant part of the Court’s opinion: 
 
“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot 
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a 
crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to 
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. ‘It is a promise of the 
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not 
enter.’ The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”108 
 
The Court immediately follows its reference to “no legitimate state interest”109 
with the phrase, “which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual.”110 The Court’s emphasis on “respect for their private lives,”111 on “control 
[of] their destiny”112, and on “personal and private life”113 suggests that the interest 
involved is not an ordinary one -- and that the Court is demanding something more than a 
rational basis. The same point is strongly suggested by the Court’s reference, in this 
paragraph, to Casey114, which of course involved a fundamental right, not a rational basis 
test. 
 
But there is a more basic reason for seeing the Court’s opinion as finding the 
relevant interest to be fundamental. The Court begins with an effort to assimilate the 
issue in Lawrence to the issues in Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, Carey, and Casey -- all of 
which are now taken, by the Court, to suggest a fundamental right in the domain of sex 
and reproduction. Hence the Court refers to “the right to make certain decisions regarding 
sexual conduct,”115 to the individual’s interest in making “certain fundamental decisions 
affecting her destiny,”116 and to the “emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial 
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex.”117 These statements would be unintelligible if Lawrence were based 
solely on rational basis review. Indeed, much of the Court’s opinion would be dicta. In 
the end, Lawrence is not plausibly a rational basis decision. 
 
An alternative reading is that the Court deliberately refused to specify its “tier” of 
analysis because it was rejecting the idea of tiers altogether. Perhaps the Court was 
signaling its adoption of a kind of sliding scale, matching the strength of the interest to 
the demand for state justification, without formally requiring identification of a 
                                                 
108 Id. at 2484 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847) (internal citation omitted). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 847). 
115 Id. at 2477. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 2480. 
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 fundamental right. And indeed, some of the Court’s decisions do suggest a partial 
collapse of the traditional tiers approach to judicial review.118 For many years, Justice 
Marshall complained of the rigidity of the usual tiers, urging a more open-ended form of 
balancing.119 Justice Marshall’s views appeared to fall on deaf ears. But perhaps 
Lawrence reflects some appreciation of the difficulties in fitting all cases within the 
traditional framework. This is not a wholly implausible reading, but it would be quite 
surprising if the Court meant to adopt a sliding-scale of analysis without saying so. The 
more natural interpretation is simpler: The Court’s assimilation of the Lawrence problem 
to that in Griswold and its successors suggests that a fundamental right was involved.  
 
B. Autonomy Simpliciter, or Desuetude-Informed Autonomy? 
 
 But why, exactly, does the relevant interest count as a fundamental one? There are 
two possibilities. The first is that the right to engage in consensual sex counts, simply as a 
matter of principle, as part of the liberty that the due process clause substantively 
protects. On this view, in Lawrence the Court accepted, to this extent, John Stuart Mill’s 
view in On Liberty,120 holding that the government may not interfere with (certain) 
private choices unless there is harm to others. The second and narrower idea is that this 
particular kind of sex—homosexual sex between consenting adults—counts as 
fundamental. It does so because of major changes in social values in the last half-century. 
On this view, Lawrence finds a fundamental right as a result of existing public 
convictions, with which the Texas statute cannot be squared, simply because sodomy 
prosecutions are so hopelessly out of step with them. 
 
Lawrence could be read in either way. But the second interpretation is far more 
plausible. A simple autonomy reading would have consequences that the Court did not 
likely intend. As Justice Scalia suggests, it would raise serious questions about 
prohibitions on adult incest, prostitution, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and 
obscenity.121 (I do not mention his suggestion that the Court has questioned laws 
forbidding masturbation,122 for one reason: There are no laws forbidding masturbation!) 
Now it might be possible, even under the autonomy reading, to justify most or all of those 
prohibitions on the ground that they counteract concrete harms, sufficient to support the 
intrusion on a presumptively protected right. (I return to this question below.) And cases 
involving commercial activity probably must be analyzed in a way that gives the 
government more room to maneuver. But it would be remarkable if Lawrence were 
understood to require a careful inquiry into the adequacy of government justifications for 
banning (say) adult incest and bestiality.  
                                                 
118 See, e.g., the heightened approach to rational basis review in Romer, 517 U.S. 620, and Cleburne, 473 
U.S. 432, and the softened approach to strict scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
119 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
120 See Mill, supra note 11. 
121 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
122 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). There are of course laws forbidding public masturbation, but that is a 
different matter. Nothing in Lawrence suggests that states are banned from regulating sexual conduct that 
occurs in public view. 
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 In any case, a simple autonomy reading would make the Court’s apparently 
pivotal discussion of “emerging awareness” into an irrelevancy. Recall that the Court 
rejected Bowers in large part by pointing to a range of indications that bans on 
homosexual sodomy were out of step with existing values.123 Hence two factors were 
emphasized in the Court’s ruling: only thirteen states prohibited sodomy; and the sodomy 
laws were rarely enforced, through criminal prosecution, even in those states.124 It does 
appear that the Court was responding to, and requiring, an evolution in public opinion—
something like a broad consensus that the practice at issue should not be punished.  
 
These points suggest that the Court’s decision was less about sexual autonomy, 
as a freestanding idea, and closer to a kind of due process variation on the old common 
law idea of desuetude.125 According to that concept, laws that are hardly ever enforced 
are said, by courts, to have lapsed, simply because they lack public support.126 The 
rationale here is that unenforced laws lack support in public convictions, and may not be 
brought to bear, in an unpredictable and essentially arbitrary way, against private 
citizens.127 Most American courts do not accept that idea in express terms.128 But long 
ago, Alexander Bickel invoked the notion of desuetude to help account for Griswold.129 
The simple idea is that the ban on use of contraceptives by married people had become 
hopelessly out of touch with existing convictions—so much so that the ban could rarely 
if ever be invoked as a basis for actual prosecutions. The public would not accept a 
situation in which married people were actually convicted of that crime. In those 
circumstances, the statutory ban was a recipe for arbitrary and even discriminatory 
action, in a way that does violence to democratic ideals and even the rule of law. It does 
violence to democratic ideals because a law plainly lacking public support is nonetheless 
invoked to regulate private conduct. It violates the rule of law because a measure of this 
kind lacks, in practice, the kind of generality and predictability on which the rule of law 
depends.130  
 
If anything, a ban on sodomy is even worse than the Connecticut law struck down 
in Griswold. Such a ban is used, not for frequent arrests or convictions, but for rare and 
unpredictable harassment by the police. An advantage of this reading is that it mutes the 
apparent roots of Lawrence in substantive due process. The idea of desuetude is, in a 
sense, a procedural one. There is a procedural problem: a lack of fair notice combined 
with denial of equal treatment, a problem that is inevitable in a system in which criminal 
prosecutions are rare and episodic. In fact, the idea of desuetude forbids criminal 
                                                 
123 Id. at 2479-2482. 
124 Id. at 2481. 
125 See, e.g., J.R. Philip, Some Reflections on Desuetude, 43 Juridical Review 260 (1931); Linda Rogers and 
William Rogers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 Iowa Law Review 1 (1966). 
126 Mortimer Kadish and Sanford Kadish, Discretion to Disobey: A Study of Lawful Departures From 
Legal Rules 129-31 (1973). 
127 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502 (1961) (quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 
362, 369 (1940)). 
128 For discussion, see Kadish and Kadish, supra note 116, at 127-140; John Chipman Gray, Desuetude of 
Statutes in the United States, in The Nature and Sources of Law 189-97, 329-34, (2nd ed. 1921); Arthur E. 
Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 Iowa Law Review 389 (1964). 
129 See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 155 (1965). 
130 See Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (1962). 
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 punishment not in spite of public values but in their service—a claim that the Lawrence 
Court makes explicitly.131  
 
Of course this interpretation of Lawrence raises its own problems; a desuetude-
informed reading is far from simple and straightforward. The decision should not be read 
to say that each and every criminal statute becomes unenforceable if it is rarely enforced; 
that reading would be far too broad. At a minimum, it is also necessary to say that the 
rarity of enforcement is a product of the anachronistic nature of the moral judgment that 
underlies it.132 Building on this idea, the notion of desuetude might be applied whenever a 
criminal statute is rarely invoked because the public no longer supports the moral 
argument that lies behind it. Let us call this the broad version of the basic idea. But it is 
true that the Court is not well-equipped to say when statutes are anachronistic, and any 
use of desuetude, under the due process clause, is likely to be limited to certain interests 
that have a threshold of importance. Thus Lawrence must be understood as involving 
another, less ambitious version of the idea, suggesting that when those interests are 
implicated, the state may not rely on a justification that has lost public support. Let us call 
this the narrow version of the idea. 
 
Because of its modesty, the narrow version is obviously preferable; the Court 
should not be read to have gone as far as the broad version suggests. But there is an 
evident problem with the narrow version. For it to operate, we must have an antecedent 
way, to some extent independent of public convictions, to determine whether an interest 
has some kind of constitutional status. Without that independent way, the narrow version 
dissolves into the broader one: Any interest on which the public no longer wants to 
intrude becomes a fundamental one by definition. (Is this true of the right to use 
marijuana within the home? Of the right of sixteen-year-olds to drink alcohol within the 
home?) In the end, the Lawrence Court must have concluded that as a matter of principle, 
the right to engage in same-sex relations had a special status in light of the Court’s 
precedents taken along with emerging public convictions -- and that the moral arguments 
that supported the ban were no longer sufficient to justify it.  
 
In this sense, the “emerging public awareness” emphasized by the Court operated 
at two levels. First, it served to discredit the particular moral justification for the law, in a 
conventional use of the idea of desuetude. Second, it helped to inform the Court’s 
judgment that the interest at stake could not be distinguished, in principle, from those 
involved in Griswold, Eisenstadt, Carey, and Roe. Hence some idea about autonomy is an 
inescapable part of the analysis. This second use of public convictions is not a use of the 
idea of desuetude; but it does belong in the same family. There are a number of 
complexities here, and I shall return to the shortly. 
 
 
 
                                                 
131 123 S. Ct. at 2480. 
132 A freestanding desuetude argument would raise questions about many statutes, including those 
forbidding the private possession of marijuana. In that latter case, the ban does not affect a constitutionally 
fundamental interest, and hence a serious due process objection would be hard to mount. 
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 C.  The Dog That Barked Very Quietly: Equal Protection 
 
Lawrence was rooted in the due process clause, not the equal protection clause.133 
But it defies belief to say that it is not, in a sense, an equal protection ruling. Everyone 
knows that the case was about sexual orientation. When Justice Scalia urges that the 
Court “has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda,”134 he is correct in an 
important sense: The Court was not willing to legitimate, or to deem legitimate, “the 
moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.”135 I have 
questioned Justice Scalia’s broader suggestion that the Court meant to say that a moral 
position, unaccompanied by convincing evidence of tangible harm, is an illegitimate 
basis for law. The Court was concerned not to excise moral grounds from law, but instead 
to excise a particular moral ground, that is, the moral ground that underlies criminal 
prohibitions on same-sex relationships. The Court’s judgment to this effect had a great 
deal to do with considerations of equality. 
 
It is not hard to find support for this claim in the Court’s opinion. In many places, 
the Court suggested that equality, and a particular sort of moral claim, were pivotal to the 
outcome. Consider this suggestion: “Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek 
autonomy . . . just as heterosexual persons do.”136 Or this: “When homosexual conduct is 
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to 
subject homosexual persons to discrimination in both the public and in the private 
spheres.”137 Or this: “[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship . . . and still 
retain their dignity as free persons. . . . The liberty protected by the Constitution allows 
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”138 Now delete, from the sentences just 
quoted, the word “homosexual,” and replace it with the word “adulterous,” or 
“bigamous,” or “incestuous.” Somehow the sentences do not work. The Court’s due 
process decision was powerfully influenced by a claim of equality.  
 
D. What Lawrence Did, with an Evaluation 
 
If we emphasize the Lawrence Court’s reliance on “emerging awareness,” we will 
see the decision as most closely analogous to Griswold and Reed. When the Court held 
that married people could not be prohibited from using contraceptives139, it was using the 
due process clause to forbid the invocation of a law that could not be fit with current 
values. When the Court began to invalidate sex discrimination of the most arbitrary 
kinds140, it was not making a revolution on its own. Lawrence is in the same spirit. To the 
extent that the Lawrence Court treated homosexual sodomy as equivalent, in principle, to 
opposite-sex relationships, it was responding to the fact that with respect to the 
invocation of the criminal law, the American public had come to the same conclusion. To 
                                                 
133 Id. at 2482. 
134 Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
135 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
136 Id. at 2482. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 2478. 
139 Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. 
140 Reed, 404 U.S. 71. 
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 the extent that the Court held that no legitimate state interest justified the ban on same-
sex relationships, it was acting in the service of widely held convictions. Judges do not 
interpret the Constitution to please majorities. But widespread social convictions are 
likely to influence anyone who lives in society. Judges live in society. Lawrence is a 
testimonial to this process of influence. 
 
If Lawrence is understood in these terms, should it be applauded or deplored? I do 
not intend to answer that question fully here. An obvious issue is: Compared to what? I 
do believe that Justice O’Connor’s equal protection argument would have been better and 
simpler—better because of its fit with precedent, simpler because analytically in the same 
line with Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer.141 But what of the other alternatives? I have 
urged that if Lawrence is a kind of American-style desuetude, it can claim to be rooted in 
a form of procedural due process. A law of the sort that the Court invalidated is a 
violation of the rule of law; it does not provide fair notice; and it invites arbitrary and 
unpredictable enforcement, of just the sort that occurred in the case itself. Such a law also 
lacks a democratic pedigree. It is able to persist only because it is enforced so rarely.  
 
1. Specifying desuetude, American-style. If a desuetude-type rationale is 
accepted, it is necessary to know when, exactly, it will be triggered. We can imagine 
many possibilities. The Lawrence Court emphasized two separate points: few states now 
forbid consensual sodomy; and even in states in which a ban is in place, prosecution is 
rare. The first point stresses the problem of states-as-outliers; the second is a more 
standard point about intrajurisdictional desuetude. In Lawrence itself, the two points 
marched hand-in-hand, but they could easily be pulled apart. A law might fit with 
existing social values in one state, but those values might be rejected in the rest of the 
union.142 This would not be a simple case of desuetude, because the statute would, by 
hypothesis, receive support within the relevant state. By contrast, a state-specific 
analysis, based on more conventional ideas about desuetude, would emphasize the ideas 
of fair notice and arbitrariness and suggest that at least when certain interests are 
involved, a state may not bring the criminal law to bear when the values that underlie 
those laws have been anachronistic in that very state. Certainly the standard desuetude 
idea cannot be invoked in a state in which the law in question is actively enforced. For 
the Supreme Court, the easiest cases are Lawrence and Griswold: those in which the 
relevant values lack support both in the enforcing state and in the nation as a whole. My 
emphasis here is not on national outliers, but on the fact that in Texas itself, the sodomy 
statute, hardly ever enforced, created problems of both unpredictability and 
arbitrariness.143 
                                                 
141 To say this is not to deny that Justice O’Connor’s approach would raise complexities of its own. For 
example, it is not so easily to limit its reach; the approach would seem to raise doubts about bans on same-
sex marriage, no less than the substantive due process approach. As I have suggested, one of the difficulties 
for the Lawrence Court was that any invalidation of the Texas law, which seemed constitutionally 
intolerable, would inevitably raise questions about practices that, whether or not constitutionally tolerable, 
the Court would not like to doubt for prudential reasons at least. 
142 The role of the Court in disciplining practices that are out of step with national values is stressed in 
Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 327-28 (1992). 
143 It should be noted that we do not quite know whether some kind of coherent pattern underlay 
enforcement of the law in Texas. The facts of Lawrence suggest one possibility: Perhaps prosecutors would 
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2. Too little? But for many defenders of the outcome in Lawrence, this 
interpretation will give the plaintiffs far too little. One obvious alternative is a more 
critical approach to conventional morality, one that does not define liberty by identifying 
society’s “emerging awareness” as if it were a kind of fact for judicial use, but that 
attempts to define the idea of liberty, and the legitimacy of intrusions on it, by reference 
to an account that is independent of whatever views now happen to prevail. For those 
who prefer this more critical approach, the problem with a desuetude-type interpretation 
is that it would allow states to have sodomy laws, or adultery laws, or fornication laws, so 
long as those laws are taken seriously and actually brought to bear against the citizenry. 
Wouldn’t that situation be worse rather than better? 
 
In fact it is possible to understand the Court’s opinion in this more critical and 
evaluative way. Certainly the Court’s use of the word “awareness” suggests that it 
believes the emerging view to be worth attention because it is right. Consider too the 
Court’s suggest that the framers “knew times can blind us to certain truths and later 
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to 
oppress.”144 Perhaps we might build on the Court’s reference to “truths” and what 
happens “in fact” to suggest its endorsement of a more independent and critical approach 
to public convictions.  
 
If the Court’s judgments on the appropriate content of liberty could be said to be 
reliable, then a more critical approach would have much to be said in its favor. But even 
those who endorse that approach might agree that Lawrence, read in the way that I have 
suggested, has the advantage of comparative modesty—and that it does not foreclose use 
of the critical approach for the future. And for those who endorse the critical approach, 
there are three reasons for caution. The first is the simple risk of judicial error. Unmoored 
from public convictions, there is a risk that the Court’s conception of liberty will be 
confused or indefensible. (Recall Dred Scott v. Sandford145 and Lochner v. New York146.) 
The second problem is the danger of unintended bad consequences. Even if the Court has 
the right conception of liberty, it may not do much good by insisting on it when the 
nation strongly disagrees. If the Court had held, in 1980, that the due process clause 
requires states to recognize same-sex marriage, it would (in my view) have been 
responding to the right conception of liberty. But it would undoubtedly have produced a 
large-scale social backlash, and very likely a constitutional amendment, that would have 
made same-sex marriage impossible. The simple point is that judicial impositions may do 
little good and considerable harm, even from the standpoint of the causes that the Court 
                                                                                                                                                 
not invade private domains to ferret out unlawful sodomy, but perhaps they would arrest people if the 
relevant acts were plainly visible. If so, one kind of arbitrariness would be avoided, for arrests would not be 
invidiously motivated or entirely random. But as the facts of Lawrence also show, a kind of randomness 
will be an inevitable result of this very policy. In any case a problem of unpredictability exists even if the 
policy of arrest and prosecution follows some kind of pattern: The defendants in Lawrence had no reason to 
know that they would fall within that pattern.  
144 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (emphases added). 
145 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that African-Americans were not citizens contemplated by the 
Constitution). 
146 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding unconstitutional a state statute establishing maximum working hours). 
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 hopes to promote. To be sure, these points are cautionary notes and no more. But at the 
very least, they suggest that where the Court is in a position to choose, a desuetude-type 
ruling, building on widespread convictions, has considerable advantages over a ruling 
that is based on the Court’s own conception of autonomy. 
 
3. Too much? Of course Lawrence, read in the way I have suggested, might be 
criticized from other directions. Perhaps a better alternative is Thayerism: An approach 
that would uphold any intrusion on liberty unless it lacks even a minimally rational 
basis.147 This approach might be defended on the ground that a judicial judgment about 
emerging public convictions is not very reliable, and certainly less so than the evidence 
provided by actual legislation. If there is a serious risk in judicial effort, why not require 
people to resort to their political remedies? I believe that the idea of desuetude provides a 
partial answer. If legislation is infrequently enforced, most citizens can treat it as 
effectively dead. They have nothing to worry about. At least in clear cases, it seems 
plausible, and inoffensive to democratic values, to use the Due Process Clause to forbid 
criminal prosecutions in cases of this kind. Both Griswold and Lawrence are defining 
examples.  
 
But perhaps the Court would have done better, in Lawrence, to continue on the 
path marked out by Bowers and Glucksberg, and hence to uphold any intrusion on liberty 
unless it runs afoul of Anglo-American traditions. Due process traditionalism might be 
supported on the ground that federal judges are not especially good at evaluating our 
practices, and that if a practice has endured there is good reason to support it, if only 
because many people have endorsed it, or at least not seen fit to change it. Constitutional 
traditionalism therefore makes decisions simpler at the same time that it makes them less 
likely to go wrong. If economic terminology is thought to be helpful here, the use of 
traditions by imperfect human beings might not be perfect, but it is the best way to go 
because it minimizes both “decision costs,” taken as the burdens of deciding what to do, 
and “error costs,” taken as the problems introduced by making mistakes.  
 
A central question is whether tradition-bound judges will make more or fewer 
errors than judges who depart from traditions and pay a great deal of attention to 
conventional morality. At least some of those who are skeptical about substantive due 
process might endorse traditionalism as a possible source of law, but also conclude that it 
is proper for the Court to strike down statutes that lack support in popular convictions. In 
other words, the desuetude-type approach of the Lawrence Court might be a supplement 
to due process traditionalism, rooted in similar concerns. Indeed, a desuetude-type 
approach has the advantage of underlining the procedural features of procedural due 
process. As we have seen, a statute like that invalidated in Lawrence fails to provide 
predictability, and it is a recipe for arbitrary enforcement. The Court’s refusal to permit 
criminal convictions, under these circumstances, is not radically inconsistent with 
democratic ideals. In a sense, it helps to vindicate them. 
 
                                                 
147 See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893). 
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 4. Coherence, optimal deterrence, and expressive condemnation. Another 
response is possible, one that would raise questions about the coherence of any approach 
that draws on the idea of desuetude. For governments, there is a tradeoff between the 
magnitude and the frequency of punishment. A government might decide to lessen the 
deterrent signal simply by scaling back enforcement. In the context of conduct that a state 
would like to deter, but not greatly, the sensible strategy might be to maintain a 
prohibition but to enforce it rarely. It is easy to imagine a city taking this approach with 
respect to non-flagrant speeding (driving, say, ten miles over the speed limit), or certain 
parking offenses (giving tickets rarely in certain places, for example), or certain alcohol 
or drug offenses (rarely arresting or convicting teenagers for use of alcohol, or 
infrequently arresting or convicting people for marijuana use). In fact many prohibitions 
are rarely enforced. Is this situation unconstitutional? Why is a state banned from making 
this particular tradeoff between severity and probability of sanction? In any case the ex 
ante deterrent effect of a rarely enforced law, including the sodomy law in Texas, applies 
equally to all those subject to it. Isn’t this ex ante equality a sufficient response to the 
objection of unpredictability? 
 
To answer this objection, it is necessary to narrow the due process ruling in 
Lawrence. The problem with the sodomy law was not only the fact that it was enforced 
rarely; infrequent enforcement stemmed from the particular fact that the moral claim that 
underlay it could no longer claim public support. The same cannot be said in the 
examples just described; in those cases, there is public ambivalence about arrest and 
conviction, but not because of a widespread belief that the prohibition is itself outmoded. 
But Lawrence does not depend on this factor alone. It is also important that the interest at 
stake is similar, in principle, to those protected by earlier cases. In these circumstances, 
the state is required to produce, by way of justification, something other than a moral 
position that no longer fits with public convictions. To be sure, the effect of a rarely-
enforced law is similar to that of a lottery, and in that respect there is a degree of ex ante 
equality. But people are punished ex post, not ex ante, and it is the ex post randomness 
that supports the Court’s ruling, at least in the light of the particular interest involved. 
 
Consider a final argument. One purpose of the criminal law is to permit 
expressive condemnation. For some conduct, the social judgment is in favor of such 
condemnation but opposed to much in the way of actual prosecution. As examples, 
consider laws forbidding adultery or the consumption of alcohol by sixteen-year-olds. 
Rare enforcement reflects a belief that the law, operating in conjunction with social 
norms, will deter misconduct optimally—and that criminal prosecution would be too 
heavy-handed, at least in most cases. Does it follow, from Lawrence, that states are 
forbidding from adopting the strategy of expressive condemnation with rare prosecution? 
Why isn’t that strategy the most sensible one in some circumstances? The answer is that 
when certain interests are involved,148 states are indeed forbidden from following that 
strategy, and the reason has to do with the lack of fair notice and the inevitability of 
randomness. As I have emphasized, these are the conventional (procedural) concerns of 
the due process clause. 
 
                                                 
148 Consumption of liquor does not fall within the category of protected interests; on adultery, see below, 
24 
 IV. Implications 
 
 What are the implications of Lawrence? Because of the opacity of the Court’s 
opinion, this is not an easy question to answer. In the fullness of time, it is imaginable 
that Lawrence will be a sport, a decision with no descendents, one in which the Court 
struck down a law that shocked its conscience but that proved unable to generate further 
doctrine. But it is no less imaginable that Lawrence will turn out to have broad 
consequences for regulation of sexual relationships, in a way that vindicates a quite 
general interest in sexual autonomy. Bowers had stopped a number of potential doctrinal 
innovations here; Bowers is no longer good law. And it is wholly imaginable that 
Lawrence will draw into question many forms of discrimination against gays and 
lesbians. If my basic argument is correct, the eventual path of the law will have a great 
deal to do with public convictions over time. I am concerned in this section with the logic 
of the Court’s opinion and with its bearing on issues that the Court did not resolve. 
 
A. Sex 
 
 Justice Scalia urged that Lawrence decrees an end to “morals” legislation149, and 
in the aftermath of the decision, it is natural to wonder about the constitutionality of laws 
forbidding sexual harassment, prostitution, adultery, fornication, obscenity, polygamy, 
and incest. Before Lawrence, such laws seemed quite secure. The Court had made clear 
that substantive due process would be used only to protect rights well-recognized by 
tradition150; and in any event the privacy cases had originally been defined with close 
reference to reproduction and its control, not to sex itself.151 But after Lawrence, it would 
be possible to contend that many statutory restrictions impose unconstitutional barriers to 
consensual sexual activity. And in each of these cases, it would be possible to urge both 
that the relevant right is a fundamental one and that the state lacks a legitimate basis for 
interfering with consensual activity. Let us see how the underlying issues might be 
assessed.  
 
1. Coercion. The easiest cases involve coercion. In such cases, the predicate for 
Lawrence—consent—is absent. If consensual sex is not involved, there is no fundamental 
right that would require the state to provide a compelling justification. And for the same 
reason, the state has a perfectly legitimate, even compelling, reason to impose a 
restriction. In cases of sexual harassment, coercion of one or another sort is generally 
involved152, and hence a legal ban is perfectly acceptable. The same is true for many and 
                                                 
149 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
150 This was the key point in lower court decisions rejecting constitutional challenges to decisions to punish 
(for example) adultery, see Mercure v. Van Buren Township, 81 F.Supp.2d 814 (E.D. Mich. 2000); 
Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357 (Mass. 1983); City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464 
(Tex. 1996); and incest, see Smith v. State, 6 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999); State v. Buck, 757 P.2d 
861 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). 
151 See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Roe, 410 U.S. 113. 
152 See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
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 perhaps most cases involving incest, which involve minors unable to give legal 
consent.153 The interest in preventing coerced sex is sufficient.  
 
But somewhat harder cases are imaginable even here. Suppose, for example, that 
under a public university’s sexual harassment policy, a teacher and a graduate student are 
banned from having a consensual relationship, even though the teacher is not (and will 
not be) in a supervisory position over the student. Or suppose that the incestuous relations 
are between adults—first cousins, let us say. If an “as applied” challenge were product, 
these would be genuinely difficult after Lawrence. If real consent is found in either case, 
a fundamental right might well be involved. But it would be possible to defend the broad 
sexual harassment prohibition as a way of reducing risks and introducing clarity for all. 
And it would be possible to defend the ban on incest among adults as a way of 
eliminating certain psychological pressures and protecting any children who might result 
from medical risk.154 In neither case can it be said that the prohibitions run afoul of some 
emerging national awareness. These are far weaker cases for invalidation than Lawrence, 
but some of the underlying logic of the case seems to raise doubts in imaginable 
applications. 
 
2. Commerce. Other easy cases involve commerce. In the case of prostitution, it is 
hard to urge that a fundamental right is involved.155 Under Lawrence, commercial sex is 
to be treated differently.156 The outcome is easy; but the analysis is not. Why the sharp 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial sex? Why are sexual relations 
unprotected, or less protected, if dollars are exchanged? Books, after all, are protected, 
whether they are given away or sold. Part of the analysis here might be that commercial 
sex should not be treated more protectively than any other kind of commercial 
interaction, now subject to rational basis review.157 But if sexual relationships have a 
special constitutional status, this distinction is far from obvious. The more basic claim 
must be that special constitutional status attaches to sexual intimacy, not to sexual 
relationships,158 and that intimacy in the relevant sense is not involved when sex is 
exchanged for cash.159 Hence no fundamental right is involved. To be sure, this argument 
is not entirely convincing. Many sexual relationships (including many that fall within the 
category protected by Lawrence) do not involve intimacy (except by definition). But 
perhaps the Court can be said to be suggesting that noncommercial sex involves intimacy 
frequently enough to justify protection of the overall class, whereas the opposite is true of 
sex-for-money.  
                                                 
153 See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 353 S.E.2d 342 (Ga. 1987); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 514 A.2d 890 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1986). 
154 See, e.g., In re Tiffany Nicole M., 571 N.W.2d 872 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997); but see In re Termination of 
Parental Rights to Zachary B., 662 N.W.2d 360 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). 
155 See, e.g., J.B.K., Inc. v. Caron, 600 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1979); Morgan v. Detroit, 389 F.Supp. 922 (E.D. 
Mich. 1975); State v. Allen, 424 A.2d 651 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980); Blyther v. United States, 577 A.2d 
1154 (D.C. 1990). 
156 123 S. Ct. at 2484. 
157 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
158 The case of bestiality should be understood similarly. It would be frivolous to argue that bans on 
bestiality eliminate the kind of intimate relationship protected by Lawrence. 
159 See Commonwealth v. Walter, 446 N.E.2d 707, 710 (Mass. 1983); State v. Price, 446 N.W.2d 813, 818 
(Iowa 1976). 
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 But what justification does the state have for forbidding prostitution? It is 
probably sufficient here to point to the adverse effects of prostitution on the lives of 
prostitutes; the risk of exploitation (and worse) is real and serious.160 Nor are moral 
justifications, pointing to the corrosive effects of prostitution on sexuality and sex 
equality,161 ruled off-limits by Lawrence. I am not taking a position on the complex and 
disputed question whether and how prostitution should be outlawed. My suggestion is 
only that under rational basis review, restrictions on prostitution are easily defensible. 
The ban on the sale of obscenity should be understood in similar terms162; the use of 
obscenity raises different issues.163 
 
3. Without coercion and without commerce. For the state, the most serious 
problems, post-Lawrence, come in cases challenging restrictions on genuinely consensual 
and noncommercial practices. Begin with what might seem an intermediate case: bans on 
sexual devices.164 Following the previous discussion, we should distinguish here between 
sale on the one hand and use on the other. Perhaps the state could ban the sale itself, 
urging that it is attempting to regulate a commercial enterprise, and that it is permitted to 
do so in light of the commercial-noncommercial distinction just made. Even this is not 
entirely clear.165 And could the state make it a crime for people to use such devices? The 
right to do so might well fall within the protection of fundamental interests. In any case 
what is the state’s justification for banning such use? It is easy to imagine an as-applied 
challenge, in which a married couple attacks a ban on either the sale or the use of sexual 
devices with reference to Griswold itself.166 The difference is that in Griswold, the ban on 
use of contraceptives was an effort to prevent non-procreative sex, whereas in the 
hypothetical case, the state is banning devices that are designed to increase sexual 
pleasure. But why, exactly, would it seek to do that? Is there something wrong with 
certain sources of sexual pleasure within constitutionally protected relationships? Perhaps 
the answer would be affirmative if real harms were involved, as for example through 
sadomasochistic practices. Almost certainly the state could justify a prohibition on the 
public display of such devices. But we are not now speaking of these questions. At first 
                                                 
160 See, e.g., People v. Mason, 642 P.2d 8, 12 (Colo. 1982); People v. Johnson, 376 N.E.2d 381, 386 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1978). Of course some of the risk stems from the very fact that prostitution is unlawful. 
161 See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955) (Minton, J., dissenting); People v. Warren, 535 
N.W.2d 173, 177 (Mich. 1995) (Levin, J., dissenting); State v. Wright, 561 A.2d 659, 662 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1989). 
162 See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1973). 
163 The use can be banned under Miller, by reference to moral objections, though Stanley v. Georgia, US, 
protects the use of obscenity within the home. A different and in my view better analysis would point to 
actual harms, see Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and 
the First Amendment, Duke LJ (1996). 
164 See, e.g., Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001); Pleasureland Museum, Inc. v. Beutter, 288 
F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2002) (remanding for consideration of whether a ban on sexual devices violated a 
fundamental right to privacy). 
165 Recall that the constitutional protection given to the use of contraceptives was extended to the sale of 
contraceptives. See Carey, supra. If a ban on the sale of contraceptives cannot be justified, it is not clear, 
after Lawrence, how the state can justify a ban on the sale of sexual devices. Before Lawrence, it might 
have been said that the privacy cases did not protect sexual activity as such, but merely banned the state 
from punishing that activity through the indirect and discriminatory means of risking unwanted pregnancy. 
But Lawrence forbids this narrow reading of the cases. 
166 See Williams, id. at 952-53 (suggesting that an as-applied challenge is plausible). 
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 glance, individuals have a fundamental interest here, and the state seems to lack a 
legitimate basis for intruding on that interest.  
 
If there were laws forbidding masturbation, Lawrence would indeed raise 
extremely serious questions about them. Fortunately, there are no such laws.167 What 
about laws forbidding fornication, understood to mean non-adulterous sex outside of 
marriage?168 Lawrence creates serious doubts, simply because coercion and consent are 
not present. In any case, there seems to be an emerging social awareness that fornication 
is not a proper basis for criminal punishment.169 And with respect to consenting adults, it 
is not easy to produce a legitimate ground for interfering with non-adulterous sex.170 As I 
have noted, fully consensual incest is a somewhat harder case. In the case of adult 
brothers and sisters, it might be urged that the goal is to prevent harms to any children 
who might result, or psychological difficulties that would predictably produce and 
accompany any such relationships. Certainly the ban on sexual relations within the family 
cannot be said to be anachronistic. There is no “emerging public awareness” that such 
relations should be accepted. But imagine, for example, that sex is banned among first 
cousins, in circumstances in which any harms are highly speculative. Rational basis 
review would be satisfied. But Lawrence does not apply rational basis review, and in 
some applications, the ruling would seem to throw legal prohibitions on incest into 
considerable doubt. 
 
The most difficult cases involve laws forbidding adultery.171 We could imagine 
actual adultery prosecutions172; we could also imagine cases in which government takes 
adverse employment action against those involved in adulterous relationships.173 Here as 
in other contexts, it would be possible to urge that a consensual relationship is involved, 
one with which the state may not interfere on purely moral grounds. On the other hand, it 
is possible to justify prohibitions on adultery by reference to harms to third parties: 
children, in many cases, and the betrayed spouse, in many more cases. The adultery laws 
can be seen as an effort to protect the marital relationship, involving persons and 
interests, including those of children, that are harmed if adultery occurs.174 Marriage can 
and often is understood as an exchange of commitments, which have individual and 
social value; and a prohibition on adultery, moral and legal, operates in the service of 
                                                 
167 As I have noted, Lawrence raises no questions about laws forbidding public masturbation. The most 
plausible objection would be that mere offense is not a legitimate basis for regulating noncoercive sex; and 
indeed Justice Scalia seems to read the Court’s opinion to have that implication. But the Court’s rejection 
of the moral basis of the ban on sodomy should not be taken to forbid governments from protecting people 
from unwanted viewing of other people’s sex lives. 
168 See, e.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 449 U.S. 927, 929 n. 2 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 11-8 (1977)). 
169 See, e.g., id.; In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441, 444 (Ga. 2003); State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 339 (N.J. 
1977). 
170 Admittedly, rational basis review might be satisfied if, for example, the state urged that it was 
attempting to reduce the risks of unwanted pregnancy and venereal disease. But after Lawrence, rational 
basis review is unlikely to be applied here. 
171 See Marcum v. MacWharter, 308 U.S. 635 (2002). 
172 See Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357 (Mass. 1983). 
173 See Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F.Supp. 1465 (D. Utah 1995); City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 
S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1996). 
174 See Oliverson, id., at 1477. 
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 those commitments. If rational basis review is involved, prohibitions on adultery should 
certainly be acceptable—except, perhaps, in cases in which the married couple has agreed 
to non-exclusivity (in which case criminal prosecution would be especially surprising).  
 
The difficulty here is that in the context of adultery, criminal prosecutions are 
extremely unusual, at least as rare as criminal prosecutions for sodomy. There is a good 
argument that criminal prosecutions, in this context, are inconsistent with emerging social 
values. This is not because adultery is thought to be morally acceptable; it is not. It is 
because adultery is not thought to be a proper basis for the use of the criminal law. 
Perhaps it could be said that Lawrence turned at least in part on the Court’s evident desire 
to ensure against practices that would “demean[] the lives of homosexual persons.”175 It 
is not plausible to say that the Court should take special steps to ensure against practices 
that would “demean the lives of” adulterers. But in the end, it is not so easy to distinguish 
an adultery prosecution from the sodomy prosecution forbidden in Lawrence.176  
 
B. Sexual Orientation, Employment, and Marriage 
 
1. Employment. May a public employer discharge or punish an employee because 
of his sexual orientation? Before Lawrence, the lower courts were divided on the issue.177 
The logic of Bowers supported the decisions upholding such discharges, at least against 
due process challenges. And it was possible to urge that because homosexual activity is 
not protected by the Constitution, government employees are permitted to discriminate 
against those who engage in that activity. At first glance, however, Lawrence resolves 
that question the other way. A public employer is not permitted to discharge an employee 
because she has exercised a constitutional right (an oversimplification to which I shall 
return). If an employee has converted to Catholicism, or voted for a Republican, she may 
not be adversely affected for that reason. So too if an employee has exercised a right 
protected by the due process clause. A state may not refuse to hire a secretary who has 
used contraception or had an abortion. Under Lawrence, government may not refuse to 
hire people who have engaged in same-sex relations. It could perhaps be argued that a 
criminal punishment is worse than a civil disability, and hence that the prohibition on 
                                                 
175 123 S. Ct. at 2482. 
176 Employment discrimination by the state against adulterers raises further complexities. On a standard 
analysis, protection against criminal prosecution, if it exists, is conclusive on the issue of public 
employment, forbidding discrimination against people who have engaged in constitutionally protected 
activity. One exception would apply when the government can invoke distinctive employment-related 
grounds for the discrimination. A public university’s admissions office need not hire, as director of 
admissions, people who speak out in favor of race discrimination; perhaps discrimination againstadulterers 
can, in some contexts, be similarly justified. In any case everything turns on the reason for a due process 
ruling. If adultery prosecutions were banned on the basis of a rationale tied to the illegitimacy of using the 
criminal law, perhaps civil disabilities, as through employment discrimination, would be permissible. 
177 See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that homosexuals 
are not a protected class under Title VII); Childers v. Dallas Police Dep’t, 513 F.Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 
1981) (holding that a police department could refuse to hire a gay activist because of doubts about his 
character). Compare Glover v. Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 F.Supp.2d 1160 (S.D. Ohio 
1998) (finding no rational basis for a decision not to renew the contract of a homosexual teacher); Weaver 
v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F.Supp.2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998) (to the same effect).  
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 criminal prosecution does not entail an equivalent prohibition on adverse employment 
actions. But the cases just described should be sufficient response to that argument.  
 
Most cases of adverse employment action, prompted by homosexual activity, are 
easy after Lawrence. But there are some possible responses. One would emphasize the 
reading I have emphasized here: Lawrence turned not simply on a finding of a 
fundamental right, but more importantly on the Court’s conclusion that the Texas law 
was no longer supported by public convictions. If desuetude is involved, then perhaps 
employment discrimination is permitted even if criminal prosecution is not. This 
argument is not implausible or incoherent; if we emphasize the idea of desuetude, then a 
moral judgment might be permissible in the employment context even if it cannot be 
invoked as a basis for criminal prosecution. But this approach reads Lawrence a bit too 
finely. The Court is best read to have found a fundamental interest, whatever its reason 
for doing so; and if so, states may not refuse to hire people who have engaged in the 
relevant behavior.  
 
Another response would emphasize that the government sometimes may indeed 
refuse to hire people for engaging in constitutionally protected activity. The President is 
permitted to fail to employ, as Secretary of State, someone who has publicly criticized his 
policies; so too, a public university is allowed not to hire, or even to fire, an admissions 
officer who has said that women should not go to college, or that it is best for African-
Americans to attend vocational school. In such cases, the university can claim, plausibly, 
that it is not trying to censor anyone, or to punish them for exercising constitutional right, 
but instead to accomplish the substantive task that it has set for itself.178 Might 
discrimination against gays and lesbians be similarly justified? This is not entirely 
unimaginable, but it is hard to see. Unless the state is to capitulate to private prejudice, as 
it is generally forbidden from doing,179 it cannot easily invoke a distinct, employment-
related reason to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 
 
It also follows that the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, in the military setting, is 
under new pressure. It is no longer possible to defend that policy simply by citing 
Bowers. If the policy is to be upheld, it is because courts should give great deference to 
military judgments, applying a form of rational basis review to them. I believe that 
federal courts are not likely to interfere with military judgments here, and that there is 
good reason for a general posture of deference to such judgments. In principle, however, 
it is extremely difficult to defend “don’t ask, don’t tell” against constitutional challenge, 
and this appears to be one of the exceedingly rare settings in which judicial interference 
with military judgments would be justified.180 
 
2. Marriage. Of course the largest issue is the fate of same-sex marriage. Under 
Lawrence, must states recognize such marriages? I have suggested that Lawrence is akin 
to Griswold; but Griswold led to Roe. Perhaps Lawrence will lead to its own Roe, in the 
                                                 
178 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 US 563 (1968), for the basic framework.  
179 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 US 429 (1984). 
180 For an argument to this effect before Lawrence was decided, see Cass R. Sunstein, Designing 
Democracy (2002). 
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 form of a requirement that states allow gays and lesbians, not less than heterosexuals, to 
marry. 
 
The issue is exceedingly complex. At first glance, Lawrence has nothing at all to 
do with same-sex marriage. It involved sodomy prosecutions, brought under 
anachronistic laws, and the due process challenge to those prosecutions need not draw 
into doubt the still-universal practice of defining marriage to involve one man and one 
woman. In any case, the most natural challenge to laws rejecting such marriages is rooted 
in the equal protection clause; and Lawrence said nothing about the equal protection 
clause (perhaps because it sought to avoid the marriage issue). To the extent that the 
Court was emphasizing an “emerging awareness,” its decision does not touch 
prohibitions on same-sex marriage—and will not do so unless and until such prohibitions 
seem as outmoded as bans on homosexual sodomy do today. Existing practice suggests 
universal opposition to same-sex marriage,181 and polling evidence suggests that most 
Americans support existing practice.182 
 
But under existing law, the issue cannot be disposed of so readily. In Loving v. 
Virginia183 (probably the best-named case in all of constitutional law), the Court struck 
down a ban on racial intermarriage on two grounds. The first is the familiar equal 
protection ground, seeing that ban as a form of racial discrimination. But in a separate 
ruling, the Court also held that the ban violated the due process clause. In the Court’s 
words, “the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”184 It added that “[m]arriage is 
one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”185 
The Loving Court’s due process ruling was not free from ambiguity; the problem of racial 
discrimination played a large role. But subsequent cases confirm that the right to marry 
counts as fundamental for due process purposes—and is sufficient by itself to take the 
analysis into the domain of heightened scrutiny.  
 
In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court struck down a Wisconsin law forbidding people 
under child support obligations to remarry unless they had obtained a judicial 
determination that they had met those obligations and that their children were not likely 
to become public charges. 186 The Court insisted that “the right to marry is of fundamental 
importance for all individuals,”187 and that “the decision to marry has been placed on the 
same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, 
and family relationships.”188 The Court said that it would uphold “reasonable regulations 
that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship.”189 
But any direct and substantial interference with the right to marry would be strictly 
                                                 
181 Civil unions are a different matter, but they hardly can claim even strong minority support. 
182 See the summary at http://www.bpnews.org/bpnews.asp?ID=16337.  
183 388 U.S. 1 (1968). 
184 Id. at 12. 
185 Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
186 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
187 Id. at 384. 
188 Id. at 386. 
189 Id. at 386-87 (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977)). 
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 scrutinized. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens underlined the point, urging that the 
Constitution would cast serious doubt on any “classification which determines who may 
lawfully enter into the marriage relationship.”190 
 
In this light a prohibition on same-sex marriage is not so easy to defend in the 
aftermath of Lawrence. Under the Court’s decisions, a fundamental right does seem to be 
involved, one with which the state can defend only by pointing to a countervailing 
interest that is not merely legitimate but also compelling. In the context of same-sex 
marriage, what might that interest be? What sorts of social harms would follow from 
recognizing marriages between people of the same sex? It is conventional to argue that 
the refusal to recognize same-sex marriage is a way of protecting the marital institution 
itself. But this is very puzzling; how do same-sex marriages threaten the institution of 
marriage? Or perhaps the state can legitimately reserve the idea of marriage to men and 
women for expressive reasons. Perhaps the state can urge that it does not want to give the 
same expressive support to same-sex unions as to opposite-sex unions. But why not? As 
compared to a ban on same-sex marriages, a prohibition on adultery seems easy to justify. 
Such a prohibition is likely, in numerous cases, to protect one or even both spouses, and 
to protect children besides. If, as I have suggested, Lawrence draws prohibitions on 
adultery into some doubt, it would seem to raise extremely serious questions about 
prohibitions on same-sex marriage.  
 
But perhaps criminal punishment is special. Perhaps such punishment is quite 
different from, and to be assessed more skeptically than, a statute that confers the benefits 
of marriage to some but not to all. Perhaps Lawrence forbids the state from using the 
heavy artillery of the criminal law—but without raising questions about civil rights and 
civil duties. It would not be at all implausible to say that the Lawrence Court was 
responsive to the assortment of disabilities associated with criminal punishment—a set of 
disabilities that might be thought unique. But Loving and Zablocki themselves raise 
questions for this kind of distinction. Neither case involved a criminal prohibition. Both 
applied careful judicial scrutiny to laws saying that certain people could not enter into the 
marital relationship.  
 
Perhaps we could read Loving and Zablocki more narrowly.191 Notwithstanding 
the Court’s rhetoric, it is quite doubtful that the Court really meant to raise serious 
questions about all state laws dictating who may enter into a marital relationship. People 
are not permitted to marry dogs or cats. They are banned from marrying their first cousins 
or their aunts. They cannot marry two people, or three, or twenty. Must these restrictions 
be justified by showing that they are the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling 
state interest? If so, at least some of them would be in serious trouble. Perhaps the ban on 
incestuous marriages could be defended by pointing to the risk of coercion and the danger 
to any children who would result. But as we have seen, it is easy to imagine some cases 
in which any such defense would be weak—as, for example, where the would-be spouses 
                                                 
190 Id. at 404. 
191 It would also be possible to deny that the right to marry has a constitutional status—to urge that Loving 
and Zablocki were really equal protection cases. This view would have some appeal, especially to skeptics 
about substantive due process; but it does not fit with current law. 
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 are both adults and do not plan to have children. Perhaps bans on polygamy could be 
defended by pointing to the risk of exploitation, especially of the women involved. But 
we might doubt whether Loving and Zablocki should be read to require a careful judicial 
inquiry into that question. 
 
A possible opinion would urge that by deeming the right to marry fundamental, 
the Court did not mean to suggest that it would strictly scrutinize any law that departed 
from the traditional idea that a marriage is between (one) woman and (one) man. It meant 
only to say that when a man and a woman seek to marry, the state must have good 
reasons for putting significant barriers in their path. This rationale has the advantage of 
fitting with both Loving and Zablocki. The problem is that it seems somewhat arbitrary 
and opportunistic. Why, exactly, should a marriage be defined in this way? Why, in any 
case, should the definition be such as to allow the state not to recognize same-sex 
marriages? 
 
It is not at all easy to answer this question. In my view, the only difference 
between Lawrence and a ban on same-sex marriage is that the sodomy law no longer fits 
with widespread public convictions, whereas the public does not (yet) support same-sex 
marriages. If we rely heavily on the desuetude-type passages of the Court’s opinion, then 
it would be possible to sketch an opinion upholding the ban on same-sex marriages while 
also invalidating any state law that punishes consensual sodomy. Such an opinion would 
read Loving and Zablocki in the narrow way just suggested, with reference to slippery 
slope problems, and conclude that a rational basis is all that is required for a law that 
restricts the institution of marriage to one woman and one man. This opinion would 
certainly be plausible. The problem is a general one with any approach that relies on 
public convictions: they might not be principled. The public might have gone this far, and 
no further; but there may be no good reason for it not to have gone further. I cannot see a 
principled distinction, aside from public convictions, between what the Court did in 
Lawrence and what a court would do in striking down a state’s failure to recognize same-
sex marriages. 
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C. A Summary 
 
The discussion thus far has gone briskly over a considerable amount of territory. 
For those who find tabular summaries useful, consider the following: 
 
 Valid Invalid Probably Valid Probably Invalid 
Sexual Harassment X (coercive)    
Prostitution X (commercial)    
Incest   
X  
(coercive; but 
some hard issues 
in imaginable 
applications) 
 
Adultery    
X  
(but perhaps 
defensible by 
reference to harms 
to third parties) 
Fornication  X   
Use of sexual 
devices  X   
Polygamy X    
Employment 
discrimination 
against gays and 
lesbians 
 
X  
(except for 
military) 
X  
(military)  
Bans on same-sex 
marriage   X (for now?)  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Lawrence decision is susceptible to two broad readings. The Court’s ruling 
could easily be seen as a recognition of the constitutionally fundamental character of 
sexual liberty, disabling the state from controlling the acts of consenting adults without 
an extremely powerful justification. Alternatively, it could be seen as a rational basis 
holding with a strong Millian foundation—a holding that invalidates “morals” legislation, 
requiring harm to third parties whenever government is regulating private sexual conduct. 
In practice, these two readings would not be terribly far apart; they would use different 
doctrinal avenues to similar results.  
 
I have suggested the possibility of a third and narrower reading, one that stresses, 
as the Court did, that a criminal ban on sodomy is hopelessly out of accord with 
contemporary convictions. Thus understood, the due process principle of Lawrence 
asserts a constitutional objection to statutes that are rarely enforced and that interfere with 
important human interests without anything like a justification in contemporary values. 
Such statutes are a recipe for unpredictable and discriminatory enforcement practices; 
they do violence to both democratic values and the rule of law. I have stressed the roots 
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 of Lawrence in a narrow, American-style version of the idea of desuetude -- not because 
the broader readings are entirely implausible, but because the Court would have been 
extremely unlikely to rule as it did if not for its perception that the Texas law could not 
claim a plausible foundation in widely shared moral commitments. I believe that an equal 
protection ruling, of the sort sketched by Justice O’Connor, would have been preferable, 
not least because it would have emphasized what should be clear to all: The problem in 
Lawrence had everything to with the social subordination of gays and lesbians. But a due 
process ruling, understood in the relatively narrow terms outlined here, has considerable 
appeal. 
 
What is the reach of Lawrence? Restrictions on sex that is nonconsensual or 
commercial are surely valid. By contrast, laws forbidding fornication (defined as 
extramarital but non-adulterous sex) are surely invalid. The Constitution probably forbids 
government from punishing, either criminally or civilly, those who have used sexual 
devices. The state is almost certainly banned from discriminating against those who have 
engaged in homosexual conduct, at least outside of certain specialized contexts (most 
notably the military). In some applications, bans on incest and adultery could be subject 
to serious constitutional challenge. 
 
The hardest cases involve the failure to recognize same-sex marriages. If 
Lawrence is put together with Loving and Zablocki, it would seem clear that the 
government would have to produce a compelling justification for refusing to recognize 
such marriages, and compelling justifications are not easy to find. If we emphasize an 
equality rationale, the subtext of Lawrence, then bans on same-sex marriages are in 
serious constitutional trouble. On the other hand, the ban on same-sex marriages cannot, 
at this point in time, be regarded as an anachronism, or as conspicuously out of touch 
with emerging social values; and there are strong prudential reasons for the Court to 
hesitate in this domain. The marriage issue, more than any other, will test the question 
whether Lawrence is this generation’s Griswold—or the start of something far more 
ambitious.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Cass R. Sunstein 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL 60637 
 csunstei@midway.uchicago.edu 
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